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Openness for trade can have positive welfare effects in terms of higher growth. But increased 
openness may also increase uncertainty through a higher volatility of employment. We use 
regional data from Germany to test whether openness for trade has an impact on volatility. 
We find a downward trend in the unconditional volatility of employment, which has been 
interrupted by the re-unification period. Patterns are similar to those for output volatility. The 
conditional volatility of employment, measuring idiosyncratic developments across states, in 
contrast, has remained fairly unchanged. In contrast to evidence for the US, we do not find 
evidence for a significant link between employment volatility and trade openness.  
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1  Motivation 
There is wide-spread concern in the population and among policy makers that increased 
international integration could increase the uncertainty faced by workers. Globalization 
could then be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, international integration is 
associated with higher economic growth. On the other hand, employment conditions may 
become more unstable, thus aggravating the fear of workers to become unemployed.  
Earlier empirical studies testing the link between trade openness and employment 
volatility use cross-country panel data. These studies have the disadvantage that countries 
may have different labor market institutions and different degrees of financial openness. 
This may affect the link between trade openness and employment volatility. 
In this paper, we use regional data from Germany to show trends in employment 
volatility over the past 40 years, and we test whether openness for trade has had an 
impact on volatility. Using regional data from a single country has the advantage that 
differences in institutions do not affect our results. Also, macroeconomic developments 
are similar across the regions. Our study is motivated by a partial-equilibrium model of 
regional labor markets, which we adopt from Blanchard and Katz (1992). The model 
stresses the importance of structural and cyclical factors such as labor market regulations 
and the industrial structure determining the volatility of employment at the regional level. 
Previous empirical literature has studied the link between openness and volatility from 
three different angles.  
A first related set of studies has studied the long-run evolution of output volatility. The 
impact of the globalization process on the volatility of employment has been studied less   3
frequently. This literature finds evidence for a smaller volatility of output – the so-called  
‘Great Moderation’ – across developed countries as a result of a combination of smaller 
shocks, better inventory management, and better monetary policy (Blanchard and Simon 
2001, Stock and Watson 2004). Aßmann et al. (2006) and Buch et al. (2004) provide 
corresponding evidence for Germany. Generally, studies at the country- or sector-level 
find that greater trade openness tends to have increased output volatility (Easterly et al. 
2000, Braun and Larrain 2004, Kose et al. 2003).  
A second set of studies uses regional data to avoid the problem that outcomes across 
countries might be driven by differences in institutions. Carlino, DeFina, and Sill (2003) 
use a state-level panel dataset for the US to explain the post-war pattern of employment 
volatility. They find a decline in employment volatility, which is the result of two 
counterbalancing forces. On the one hand, the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates 
has declined and this has dampened the volatility of employment. On the other hand, 
greater openness to foreign trade has tended to increase employment volatility. Morgan, 
Rime, and Strahan (2003) find that the lifting of barriers to cross-state-border entry in US 
banking lowered fluctuations in employment growth. These results suggest that trade 
integration may increase while financial integration might dampen employment volatility. 
Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2006) look for evidence for the ‘Great Moderation’ at the level 
of US states. They find significant heterogeneity in the timing and the magnitude of 
reductions in state-level employment volatility. Hammond and Thompson (2004) study 
the impact of industrial and demographic characteristics for regional employment 
volatility in the US. Both papers do not address the impact of openness on volatility.    4
A third related strand of literature studies the link between openness and employment 
volatility by investigating the elasticity of labor demand. For a given macroeconomic 
shock, employment should fluctuate more if the labor demand elasticity of firms 
increases (Rodrik 1997). Fabbri, Haskel, and Slaughter (2003) analyze industry-level data 
for UK and US firms. They find that labor demand has become more elastic over time. 
Barba Navaretti et al. (2003) use firm-level data for Europe to show that multinationals 
adjust employment faster than national firms. However, the elasticity of labor demand is 
similar for multinationals and national firms. For Germany, results in Buch and Lipponer 
(2007) support this finding.  
In this paper, we study the link between employment volatility and openness for a state-
level dataset for Germany. For the eleven West German states, we have data for the years 
1970-2005; data for the five East German states start in 1991. Our work differs from 
earlier studies along three dimensions. First, as in earlier studies for the US, the use of 
state-level data has the advantage that differences in institutions do not matter. Second, in 
contrast to firm-level studies on labor demand elasticities, we provide evidence on the 
aggregated implications of trade openness for employment volatility. Hence, we 
investigate not only whether employment has become more or less stable for particular 
firms but whether entire regions are affected. Third, we complement earlier evidence for 
the US using data for Germany. From a methodological point of view, we follow the 
literature in estimating the determinants of employment volatility in a panel framework. 
Additionally, we go beyond earlier literature and estimate a heteroscedastic regression 
model, which allows a simultaneous modeling of employment growth and the variance of 
employment growth.    5
In Part Two, we give a summary of the theoretical determinants of employment volatility, 
and we explain how we measure these. In Part Three, we discuss the measurement of 
employment volatility, and we provide stylized facts. In Part Four, we present our 
empirical model, regression results, and robustness tests. Part Five concludes. Overall, we 
do not find evidence for a link between employment volatility and trade openness at the 
state-level. This result is robust against using conditional and unconditional measures of 
employment volatility. While we find a positive link between openness and volatility in 
selected specifications, this result is driven by individual states hosting large international 
harbors. For the average German state, greater openness has not been associated with 
greater instability of employment. Moreover, our results suggest that a higher share of the 
services sector and more rigid labor markets lower the volatility of employment.  
2  Determinants of Employment Volatility: Theory and 
Measurement 
This section uses a model of regional labor markets to derive theoretical determinants of 
regional employment volatility. We then describe how we measure these determinants 
using German state-level data.  
2.1  Theoretical Background 
Regional characteristics, labor demand and supply shocks, and the response to these 
shocks affect the volatility of employment at the regional level. This can be shown using 
a model of regional labor markets as suggested by Blanchard and Katz (1992) and 
applied to an analysis of employment volatility by Hammond and Thompson (2004). In 
their model, regional labor demand is a negative function of wages:   6
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where   denotes wages in region i relative to the national wage level,   is the 
unemployment rate, and   denotes the regional labor force. Unemployment falls in 
wages:  . Labor demand changes over time as new firms enter a region. Hence, 
reflects the response of firms to the structural demand-side patterns of the regional 
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In an open economy, shocks to labor demand can further be decomposed into a weighted 
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the weight of the home market in total sales. Foreign shocks are business cycle 
developments abroad which are, for instance, propagated through foreign trade links. The 
wage elasticity of labor demand (a) depends on factors such as the industrial structure of 
the regional economy, the ease with which capital can be substituted for labor, or labor 
market regulations. We take this wage elasticity as a parameter, but it could also vary 
with the degree of trade openness. 
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where structural factors are given by  , and shocks to labor supply are denoted by . 
In an open economy, we can again decompose these into a domestic and a foreign 


















1 , 1 , 1 + + − + = ε λ λε ε λ  denotes the weight of the domestic labor   7
supply shock. International migration would be one channel through which foreign 
factors have an impact on the domestic labor market.  
Solving the model, equilibrium mean employment growth can be written as the sum of an 
autoregressive process, of the long-run structural parameters of the economy, and of 
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4 α . Equation (4’) can also be used to compute the variance of employment 
as a function of the underlying shocks: 
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where  denotes the variance of the respective variable. Hence, the volatility of regional 
employment depends on the volatility of demand and supply shocks which, in turn, 
depend on domestic and foreign demand and supply conditions, and on the response of 
the regional economy to these shocks. Equation (5) – the variance equation – will be the 
basis for our empirical estimates below. 
2 σ  8
In our empirical model, we capture the exposure to foreign shocks through a region’s 
degree of trade openness. Equation (4’) also shows that the parameters of the model such 
as the wage elasticity of labor demand (a), the wage elasticity of labor supply (b), the 
response of unemployment to wages (c), the response of wages to employment (d), and 
the response of migration to unemployment (g) affect the volatility of employment. Since 
our main testing equation will be based on a reduced form model derived from (5), we 
will not estimate these parameters. However, we will control for the structural 
characteristics of the regional economies that affect these parameters. In the following, 
we describe the measurement of openness and regional control variables in more detail. 
2.2  Trade Openness 
In the context of the above model, trading more with the rest of the world can have a 
double-edged impact on employment volatility. On the one hand, countries or regions 
become exposed to foreign shocks, and volatility might increase. This effect might be 
aggravated by an increase in the wage elasticities of firms (b) (Rodrik 1997). On the other 
hand,  ( )
S
t i 1 ,
2
+ ε σ  and  ( )
D
t i 1 ,
2
+ ε σ  depend on the covariance of domestic and foreign shocks. 
If domestic and foreign shocks are imperfectly correlated, this might lower the volatility 
of employment.  
To test the link between employment volatility and trade openness empirically, we 
compute the ratio of the sum of imports and exports and GDP. Since we have this 
information at the state-level, we can approximate the integration of the states into the 
world economy. By splitting openness into import and export openness, we also 
investigate the channels through which trade and employment volatility are linked.   9
2.3  Labor Market Regulations 
Labor market regulations are likely to affect the elasticity of labor demand. Since we use 
regional data for Germany, we cannot test the effects of changes in labor market 
regulations that affect all states alike. However, there is evidence for a variation in the 
implementation of labor market regulations at the state-level due to a nomination bias of 
the judges to higher-level labor courts. According to evidence in Berger and Neugart 
(2007), the composition of higher-level labor courts affects the strategic behavior of 
workers and employers in their decision on taking a case to lower-level labor courts. The 
authors show that this has an impact on the unemployment rate in the respective state.  
In this paper we proxy the degree of labor market rigidity across states using the share of 
long-term unemployment. A positive correlation between employment protection and 
long-term unemployment was shown by Jahn (2002). Several cross-country studies 
support this finding using panel data for OECD countries, using rankings of dismissal 
protection between countries as the dependent variable. For example, Nickell (1999) and 
Scarpetta (1996) show a positive effect of employment protection regulations on long-
term unemployment. Nevertheless, this proxy is incomplete for two reasons. First, 
empirical research generally finds it difficult to establish a strong link between 
employment protection laws and the overall rate of unemployment (Freeman 2007). 
Second, long-term employment depends on both, structural features of the labor market 
as well as on demographic characteristics of the working age population. The time 
invariant component of demographic factors will be picked up by state fixed effects. 
Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, the impact of employment protection 
legislation and union power on the volatility of employment is not clear-cut. On the one   10
hand, the degree of unionization could have an impact on employment volatility if unions 
try to preserve employment and to reduce the flexibility of labor markets. Thus, we 
expect a negative correlation between the degree of unionization and the volatility of 
employment. Longhi et al. (2005), for instance, show empirically that the variation of 
unemployment decreases in the degree of centralization of the system of wage 
bargaining. On the other hand, employment protection legislation increases the fixed 
costs of laying off workers. Hence, large adjustments of the labor force may become 
more likely, and employment volatility might increase. 
To measure the importance of unions, we use the share of employees organized in 
German unions for every year from 1970–2005. Note that we can use this variable only if 
we do not include time fixed effects. Hence, this variable may also measure other omitted 
factors that follow a trend development over time. To account for the fact that the degree 
of unionization differs across sectors, we additionally include a proxy for the share of 
services in total output. The degree of unionization in the services sector is traditionally 
lower than in the manufacturing sector.  
2.4  Industrial Diversification 
The degree of industrial diversification captures the responsiveness of labor demand to 
shocks. Understanding the link between the regional industrial structure and economic 
stability has been an important research question in regional economics (Conroy 1975).  
This literature shows that specialization can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
industry specialization along comparative advantages in certain industrial sectors might   11
increase growth. On the other hand, it could increase volatility by increasing the exposure 
to industry-specific shocks.  
Empirical research provides mixed evidence on the volatility effects of specialization. 
Maliza and Ke (1993) and Simon and Nardelli (1992) find a stabilizing effect of industry 
diversification across US metropolitan areas. A study of Izraeli and Murphy (2003) 
confirms this result for US states. Attaran (1986) and Jackson (1984), in contrast, do not 
find any link between the industrial structure of a region and economic stability. 
Hammond and Thompson (2004) find that the impact of industrial structure weakens as 
demographic factors are included in the model. 
Here, we follow earlier literature and use a Herfindahl Index as a measure of the degree 
of industrial diversification. We take the number of workers in 15 different sectors in 
every German state and create an annual Herfindahl Index for the years 1991-2004. We 
can use this variable for the final decade of our sample only.  
2.5  Macroeconomic Developments 
In standard open economy macro models, the link between openness and volatility 
depends on the nature of the underlying macroeconomic shock (see, e.g., Senay 1998). 
Since we are considering regions within one country, monetary developments are the 
same for all regions. The same holds true for international macroeconomic developments 
such as oil price shocks. These variables are captured through time fixed effects.  
However, fiscal policy shocks may differ across regions. To account for the volatility of 
fiscal policy, we use data from the German Federal Statistic Office which gives 
aggregated government revenues and expenditures at the state level. We have this   12
information since 1985 for the West German states and since 1991 for the East German 
states.  
2.6  Population Characteristics 
Population characteristics that influence mobility of workers can be an important driver 
of regional differences in employment volatility. For example, workers who are attached 
to a specific region or who have more non-labour income will be less inclined to migrate 
due to a shock that influences labor markets (Hammond and Thompson 2004).  
In general, the costs of migration between states could be a  key factor determining 
employment volatility. Schöb and Wildasin (2007) show that greater integration between 
regions, measured in lower migration costs, leads to more flexible labour markets and 
increase fluctuations.  
The most prominent result of the literature linking migration and employment volatility is 
the importance of  population`s skill structure. Empirical literature on migration shows 
that the educational attainment of individuals is positively correlated with their propensity 
to migrate and therefore has a positive impact on employment volatility. High-skilled 
individuals can be expected to have lower migration costs than low-skilled workers. We 
have account for this by including the share of high-skilled workers within each German 
state in our regressions. Since the skill structure has been insignificant and since our main 
results do not change including this variable, we do not report these results though.   13
3  Employment Volatility: Measurements and Stylized Facts 
3.1  Measuring Employment Volatility 
To measure employment volatility, we use data on the annual average number of 
employees at the state level for the years 1970-2005. We cannot divide employees into 
full time and part-time workers since data are not available for a sufficiently long time 
period. Hence, every employee is weighted equally, independent of his or her numbers of 
hours worked. 
We begin by calculating the growth rate of employment. As we are interested in the 
cyclical evolution of employment, we apply the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter to isolate the 
cyclical from the trend growth in employment.  The relative importance of the trend and 
the cyclical component depends on the value of a smoothing parameter λ. We follow 
Ravn and Uhlig (2003) who suggest a value of 6.25 for annual data.  
Using the growth of the cyclical component of employment, we compute the squared 
growth rates   as a measure of unconditional employment volatility. Previous 
literature uses the rolling standard deviation over a five-years-window (see, e.g., Braun 
and Larrain 2004 or Carlino et al. 2003). The volatility 
2
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However, this measure of volatility has the disadvantages that the 5-year window is 
chosen somewhat arbitrarily and that the measure of volatility is autocorrelated by   14
definition. Hence, we have checked the robustness of our results using the 5-year 
standard deviation only for successive five year periods to obtain a quasi panel.  
In addition to the ‘unconditional’ volatility, we also compute the ‘conditional’ 
idiosyncratic volatility of employment growth in state i using the residuals ( it ε ) of a 
regression of employment growth on a set of time fixed effects (to capture country-wide 
business cycle effects) and lagged employment growth in state i: 
 where   is a vector of time fixed effects. (See 
Blanchard and Simon (2001), Carlino et al. (2003), or Hammond and Thompson (2004) 
for similar approaches.) The correlation between conditional and unconditional 
employment volatility is 0.26. Hence, employment persistence and aggregated 
developments account for about two-thirds of the variation in employment growth across 
states. Again, we take the squared residual   as a measure for the employment 
volatility in state i in period t.  
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3.2  Stylized Facts 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of employment volatility at the state level. Using the 
unconditional volatility, we find a reduction of employment volatility, which was 
interrupted by the reunification period (see also Buch et al. (2004) and Aßmann et al. 
(2006), in all German states except Berlin. The conditional volatility does not show this 
clear pattern. There is a considerable reduction of volatility in some states (for example 
Bayern and Saarland) whereas employment in other states became more unstable over 
time (for example Niedersachsen and Hamburg). Unreported time series regressions of 
employment volatility for each West German state on its own five lags, a reunification   15
dummy, and a time trend support this. The time trend is negative and significant for fou
out of eleven states using the unconditional volatility. It is positive and significant for 
four states when using the conditional volatility. Hence, while the unconditional volatil
mirrors the decline in aggregate volatility, idiosyncratic, state-level developments differ.  







the degree of trade openness by state. While all states have become more integrated into 
the world economy over the sample period, the degree of this increase differs across 
states. Moreover, as hosts of seaports, the city states Bremen and Hamburg have abov
average export and import shares. We will account for the possibility that these outliers 
drive our results by including interaction terms for Hamburg and Bremen and openness. 
We have three more variables which vary over time and states. The first is the 
(unconditional) volatility of output growth, which shows similar patterns as the
of employment. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 also show that the mean volatility of 
output growth is higher than the mean volatility of employment growth. The second 
variable that varies across states and time is the importance of the service industry in 
terms of the share of employees in the service sector. This share has increased for all 
states. While, at the beginning of the sample, only slightly above 40% of all employee
were occupied in services industries, this share had increased to about 70% towards the 
end of the sample. The increase in the importance of services has been particularly 
important in the East German states during the last fifteen years, reflecting the bias o
system of central planning towards manufacturing industries. Finally, across all German 
states, unemployment rates have been on a trend rise throughout the sample period.   16
4  Determinants of Employment Volatility 
To analyze the determinants of employment volatility for a panel of 16 German states for 
the past four decades (1972-2005), we employ two different methodologies. First, we 
look at the determinants of conditional and unconditional employment volatility. Second, 
we use a heteroscedastic regression model to simultaneously estimate the mean and the 
variance equation derived above (see Section 2.1). 
4.1  Regression Model: Determinants of Employment Volatility 
Our first empirical model links the standard deviation of employment growth to openness 
and aggregated shocks: 
it it it t it i it u Open y X X n + + Δ + + + = Δ 5
2
4 2 1 1
2 β β β β α    (6) 
where   = squared cyclical component of employment growth in state i at time t , 
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i 1 α  = state-fixed effects,   = time-varying explanatory variables at the state-level, 
 = time-varying explanatory variables at the country-level,   = squared cyclical 
component of output growth, and   = trade openness of states. As an alternative to 
including the time-varying explanatory variables, we include a full set of time fixed 
effects ( ). These account for business cycle effects such as changes in monetary policy 








We follow Arellano (1987) and compute robust standard errors which allow for both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary form. In addition, we use a quasi-panel   17
with non-overlapping observations as a robustness test. (See Braun and Larrain (2004) for 
an application to industry-panel data.)  
4.2  Regression Results: Employment Volatility 
Regression results for the determinants of employment volatility at the regional level in 
Germany are reported in Table 2. We estimate the model separately for the full sample of 
16 states (Table 2a) and for the sample of 10 West German states (excluding Berlin) 
(Table 2b). This accounts for the fact that the East German states might exhibit special 
characteristics due to the post-unification catching up process. Since most results are 
similar for the two specifications, we will report only the main differences below. 
Generally, a full set of time fixed effects is included. The exception is the specification in 
Column 7, which includes the long-term unemployment rate and the degree of 
unionization, which do not vary across the German states.  
Our baseline specification includes the volatility of output growth, trade openness, a re-
unification dummy, and time fixed effects as explanatory variables (column 1). We 
modify this specification splitting trade into imports and exports (columns 2 and 3), 
adding the volatility of government spending and revenues (column 4), adding a proxy 
for the degree of industry diversification (column 5), the state-level unemployment rate 
and the share of the services sector (column 6). In columns 8-10, we re-estimate the 
model for the conditional employment volatility and the three proxies for trade openness. 
In terms of the explanatory power, our model performs quite well with an adjusted R² of 
0.29-0.74, depending on the specification chosen.   18
Our first finding is that we have a positive and significant coefficient of output volatility. 
We should be careful when interpreting this as a causal effect of output volatility on 
unconditional employment volatility because of the endogeneity problems which arise by 
using output volatility as an explaining variable for employment volatility. In fact, re-
estimating the model and instrumenting output growth volatility by its own lags yields an 
insignificant coefficient. For the West German sub-sample, the coefficient on output 
volatility is insignificant if we use the conditional volatility of employment and output 
growth instead, suggesting that the unconditional volatility of output growth picks up the 
persistence and autocorrelation of employment volatility. 
Trade openness, the main variable of interest in this paper, has no significant impact on 
the volatility of employment in the full sample. Considering import and export openness 
separately shows a weakly significant impact of export openness in the specification 
using the conditional employment volatility as the dependent variable. If anything, results 
for the West German states show a somewhat stronger positive impact of trade openness 
on employment volatility. However, as will be discussed in more detail below, this result 
is driven by one state – Bremen –, which hosts a large international harbor.  
Fiscal volatility at the state level could affect the volatility of employment as well. Our 
data start in 1985 for West Germany and 1992 for East Germany. We find a positive link 
between the volatility of government spending and employment volatility for the full 
sample for the West German states. However, this effect is statistically significant only at 
the 10%-level. 
Variables capturing the industrial structure and the regulation of the labor market have a 
mixed impact. The degree of industry diversification, measured through the Herfindahl   19
index, is insignificant. Note, however, that we have this information only for later sample 
periods. A higher share of employment in the service sector is associated with lower 
employment volatility (for the West German state, this variable is insignificant). This 
finding would be consistent with the hypothesis that the demand for services is more 
stable than the demand for manufacturing output. It could also reflect a lower degree of 
exposure of the services sector to foreign competition.  
The state-level unemployment rate as a measure for the degree of labor market rigidities 
is insignificant. For two other measures for the rigidity of labor market regulations, the 
long-term unemployment rate and the degree of unionization, we have information only 
at the aggregated level. A higher long-term unemployment rate and a higher degree of 
unionization are associated with a lower volatility of employment in the West German 
sub-sample. This could be an indication that, the more regulated the labor market, the 
lower is the volatility of employment. Since the degree of unionization varies only over 
time and not across states – and thus drops out when time fixed effects are included – it 
might capture other, unobserved macroeconomic developments though and should thus 
be interpreted with caution.  
4.3  Robustness Tests 
In addition to the various modifications of the baseline specifications, we have also run 
our model as a quasi-panel on non-overlapping windows of employment volatility. 
Results are reported in Table 3 and are similar to those reported above. The main 
exceptions are that we now find a negative link between import openness and 
unconditional employment volatility, that the variables capturing structural characteristics   20
and labor market rigidities are now insignificant, and that higher volatility of government 
spending and revenues now increases employment volatility. 
In a next step, we change the specification of employment volatility in our baseline 
regression. As in many previous papers in this literature, we use the standard deviation of 
employment growth as the dependent variable. In these specifications, the dependent 
variable is the volatility of employment growth for the five-year interval starting in period 
t. All other variables are measured in t. Hence, we test whether the explanatory variables 
have a statistically significant impact on subsequent employment volatility.  In 
unreported regressions, we find qualitatively very similar results to those reported above. 
One potential concern could be that our results are driven by individual states. As shown 
in Figure 2, trade openness increased in almost all German states. But the trade dynamics 
have been particularly pronounced in the city states Hamburg and Bremen, which host 
international sea harbors. In a robustness check, we thus estimate our baseline regressions 
without Hamburg and Bremen to check whether our results are driven by these two states. 
Results are reported in Table 4. They show that the results concerning the positive impact 
of openness on volatility are indeed driven by a single state – Bremen. We can 
corroborate this result if we introduce a new variable interacting a dummy for Bremen 
with our openness measures and estimate our baseline regressions for the whole sample 
(Columns 7 and 10 of Table 4). All openness measures become insignificant. We find a 
significant positive effect of our interaction term meaning that in this case, the pure 
variation of trade openness in Bremen almost drives the whole positive effect of trade 
openness on employment volatility.   21
4.4  Heteroscedastic Regression Model 
As an alternative empirical model, we estimate a regression model with multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity as proposed by Harvey (1976). The advantage of this model is that we 
can simultaneously specify a ‘mean’ equation – explaining the growth of employment – 
as well as a ‘variance’ equation – explaining the residual variance. Hence, we can 
empirically model employment growth in close correspondence to our theoretical model 
above.  
The heteroscedastic regression model has, to the best of our knowledge, not been applied 
to an analysis of macroeconomic volatility so far. Earlier applications use the model to 
model heteroskedasticity in the residuals, but most of these papers do not focus on the 
estimation of the variance equation. Two exceptions are a recent paper by Cerqueiro et al. 
(2007), who study the loan pricing decisions of banks. Ang and Peterson (1985) estimate 
a capital asset pricing model and study both, the determinants of rates of returns and of 
the variance of returns. 
According to the heteroscedastic regression model, the mean equation gives the level of 
employment at a function of a set of explanatory variables X:  it it it X n ε β + = Δ ' ln  where 
it ε  is the residual with  [] 0 | = it it X E ε  and  [ ] { } γ ij Z' exp = σ ε it it it X VAR |
2 =  . The variance 
equation is given by  . The coefficients  γ σ it it Z'
2 = ln β  and γ  can be obtained by 
maximizing a log-likelihood function. One advantage of this methodology is that the 
parameters of the mean and of the variance equation are uncorrelated.   22
By containing both a mean and a variance equation, the heteroskedastic regression model 
already filters the cyclical component out of the data. Hence, we report results using 
unfiltered data. Results using filtered data are very similar and are available upon request. 
Our modeling strategy is to include as many variables as possible in the mean equation to 
predict employment as good as possible and to leave only the unexplained component of 
employment growth for the variance equation. In particular, our mean equation includes 
time dummies to account for aggregate fluctuations as well as state fixed effects to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity across states. In the variance equation, we likewise 
include a full set of time and state fixed effects. We again estimate the model separately 
for the full sample and for the West German states.
1 While, in principle, we use similar 
specifications as above, we restrict the robustness tests with regard to structural variables 
to the unemployment rate and the share of the services sector in each state, and we add 
the growth rate of nominal wages as an additional regressor. Note that, while real wages 
would be the preferred measure of factor costs, we lack information on regional price 
indices. This is addressed by including time and state-fixed effects.  
Results of the mean equation show, not surprisingly, that higher output growth is 
associated with higher employment growth whereas higher wage growth tends to have a 
dampening impact on employment growth. Interestingly, trade openness does not have a 
significant impact on employment growth in the regressions using filtered data, and the 
impact is even negative in the specifications using unfiltered data for West Germany. In 
these specifications, higher unemployment is associated with lower employment growth. 
                                                 
1   Since the model including all fixed effects did not converge for all specifications for West Germany, 
regressions for this sub-sample are estimated without regional fixed effects.   23
This would be consistent with a negative impact of labor market rigidities on employment 
growth. 
Turning next to the results of the variance equation, there is some evidence for a positive 
and significant impact of wage and output growth on the variance of employment growth. 
Higher growth would thus be associated with a higher volatility of growth. This would be 
at odds with the findings by Ramey and Ramey (1995), who find a negative correlation 
between growth and volatility across countries. Imbs (2007), in contrast, shows that the 
correlation between growth and volatility depends on the level of aggregation of the data. 
He finds a positive correlation between growth and volatility at the industry level. One 
explanation is that growth rates are imperfectly correlated across sectors. Our state-level 
data suggest a similar positive relationship.  
In some specifications, there is evidence for a positive impact of trade openness on the 
variance of employment growth. This effect shows up in the full as well as in the West 
German sample. Moreover, the effect is driven by the degree of import openness. 
Essentially, the finding that higher export openness is associated with a higher variance 
of employment growth corresponds to the findings using the panel and quasi-panel 
regressions above. Regressions using the residual volatility of employment growth as the 
dependent variables also showed a positive impact of trade openness on volatility, and 
this effect was driven by the degree of export openness. The dependent variable in the 
heteroscedastic regression model is similar to the dependent variable in these models, as 
it also captures the residual variance of employment growth.   24
5  Conclusions 
This paper has used German regional data to test how employment volatility has evolved 
over time and which factors account for these changes. We find that employment 
volatility has declined through the past decades, thus mirroring changes in aggregated 
output volatility. This process has been interrupted only by the reunification period in the 
early 1990s. Once we isolate idiosyncratic developments at the state level from 
macroeconomic trends, we find some weak evidence for an increase in employment 
volatility.  
Overall, a higher share of employment in the services sector, a higher share of long-term 
unemployment, and a higher degree of unionization are associated with lower volatility of 
employment. Most of these results are driven by the West German states. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that production in services is less cyclical and that labor 
market rigidities lower employment volatility. Also, higher volatility of government 
spending is correlated with higher volatility of employment growth. 
The main interest of this paper has been the link between trade openness and the volatility 
of employment. In contrast to findings for the US, we do not find evidence for a positive 
link between employment volatility and trade openness. There is evidence for a positive 
link in selected specifications but these results are driven by states hosting international 
harbors and thus having an above-average exposure to foreign trade. For the average 
German state, greater trade openness has not been associated with a greater volatility of 
employment.   25
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7  Data Appendix 
Employment: We use data provided by a working committee of employment statistics 
(Erwerbstätigenrechnung des Bundes und der Länder). This dataset contains annual 
average values of the employees at the state level for the years 1970-2005. Freelancers 
are included. 
Government revenues and expenditures: We use data from the German Federal Statistic 
Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) which contain information about the aggregated 
government revenues and expenditures at the state level. Data for the West German states 
are available since 1985, for the East German states since 1992. 
Industry diversification: Herfindahl index computed for the number of workers in 15 



















DIV  , where   is the industry diversification of state i in year t, 
 is the number of employees in state i, in sector j in year t,  is the number 
of employees in state i in year t, n is the total number of employees in state i in year t. 
Sectoral employment data are obtained from a working committee of employment 
statistics (Arbeitskreis Erwerbstätigenrechnung des Bundes und der Länder) for the years 
1991-2004.  
t i DIV ,
t j i ERW , , t i ERW ,
Long-term unemployment rate: The data are taken from the German Working Agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit). Long-term unemployed are persons who are unemployed 
more than one year. We use the data from 1977-2003. 
Openness: State-level exports and imports relative to state GDP. The data are taken from 
the German Federal Statistic Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) 
Output: Data we use are taken from the German Federal Statistic Office (Statistisches 
Bundesamt). We use the price-adjusted GDP growth at state level, for the West German 
States since 1971, for the East German states since 1991. 
Service sector: We use sectoral data from from a working committee of employment 
statistics (Arbeitskreis Erwerbstätigenrechnung des Bundes und der Länder) for the years 
1970-2004 to compute the share of employees in the service sector 
Unionization: Data on the share of employees organized in German unions are taken from 
the German employees association (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund).   29
Graph 1: Employment Volatility by German State 
This Graph plots the volatility of regional employment growth for the West German states. Employment 
growth is the year-to-year cyclical change in the level of employment. The cyclical component is obtained 
using the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter. Volatility is the standard deviation of employment growth over a 5-year 
moving window. We show the unconditional volatility of employment growth and the conditional volatility 
of employment growth based on the residual of a regression of employment growth on time fixed effects 
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Source: German Statistical Office, authors’ calculations.   30
Graph 2: Trade Openness by German State 
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Source: German Statistical Office, authors’ calculations.   31
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
See the Data Appendix for a detailed description of these variables. ‘Volatility’ is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the respective variables over a five-
year rolling window. 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Degree of industrial diversification  240  0.113  0.013  0.094  0.170 
Export openness (%)  455  0.200  0.088  0.040  0.500 
Import openness (%)  454  0.216  0.138  0.040  0.690 
Long-term unemployment rate (%)  330  0.289  0.073  0.129  0.377 
Service sector (%)  450  0.631  0.096  0.378  0.855 
Trade openness (%)  434  0.427  0.199  0.083  1.049 
Unionization (%)  450  0.282  0.044  0.198  0.336 
Volatility of employment growth (%, conditional)  290  0.345  0.169  0.081  0.969 
Volatility of employment growth (%, unconditional)  370  0.925  0.497  0.160  4.176 
Volatility of nominal government expenditures (%)  214  2.914  1.440  0.302  6.389 
Volatility of nominal government revenues (%)  214  3.883  2.358  0.517  12.611 
Volatility of real output growth (%)  370  1.568  0.646  0.120  3.420   32
Table 2: Determinants of Regional Employment Volatility  
This Table presents results of fixed effects panel estimators. t-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the state-level are reported in brackets. The full 
sample includes information for 16 German states, the West German sample includes information for 10 West German states (excluding Berlin). Data are for the 
years 1971-2005. The dependent variable is the volatility of employment, calculated as the squared growth rate of employment. ‘Unconditional’ is the unadjusted 
employment growth, ‘conditional’ are the squared residuals of a regression of the growth rate of employment on up to five own lags, year fixed effects, and a 
unification dummy. The conditional and unconditional volatility of output growth and government spending and revenue are computed analogously. See the Data 
Appendix for details on the specifications of the variables. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
a) Full sample 
  Unconditional employment volatility  Conditional employment volatility 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Volatility of output growth  0.205**  0.206**  0.209**  0.240**  0.370***  0.199**  0.168**  0.056***  0.057*** 0.058*** 
  (2.70)  (2.75)  (2.78)  (2.80) (2.95) (2.92)  (2.94)  (3.43)  (3.33)  (3.88) 
Trade openness  0.486      3.150  3.477  -2.173  -0.159  0.276     
  (0.13)      (0.74) (0.33) (0.68)  (0.10)  (1.13)     
Import  openness    -1.726            -0.167   
    (0.47)            (1.38)   
Export  openness      4.525            1.047* 
      (0.71)            (1.83) 
Volatility of government revenue        -0.006             
       (1.12)             
Volatility of government spending         0.005             
       (0.62)             
Industry  diversification         -171.245          
        (1.44)          
Unemployment           -23.789         
           (1.55)         
Service sector            -32.501***        
           (3.12)         
Long-term unemployment rate              0.331       
            ( 0 . 2 0 )        
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Table 2a continued … 
  Unconditional employment volatility  Conditional employment volatility 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Degree  of  unionization            6.661       
            ( 1 . 4 0 )        
Reunification  dummy  0/1  0.187  0.205  0.189  0.315 3.437 0.026  1.023**  -0.052  -0.064  -0.043 
  (0.38)  (0.41)  (0.36)  (0.67) (1.37) (0.04)  (2.61)  (1.27)  (1.44)  (1.02) 
Constant 0.469  1.051  -0.271  -0.804  17.312  24.263***  -1.518  0.006  0.174**  -0.085 
  (0.31)  (1.33)  (0.21)  (0.46) (1.22) (3.36)  (0.81)  (0.05)  (2.76)  (0.61) 
Observations  418  417  418  262 218 418  330  338  337  338 
Number  of  states  16  16  16  16 16 16  16  16  16  16 
R²  (within)  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.37 0.35 0.35  0.19  0.28  0.28  0.29   34
b) West Germany 
  Unconditional employment volatility  Conditional employment volatility 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Volatility  of  output  growth  0.029***  0.030***  0.029*** 0.023 0.056***  0.030***  0.075*** 0.024  0.024  0.027* 
  (4.22) (4.06) (3.91) (1.33) (4.39) (4.00) (5.49) (1.69) (1.53) (2.08) 
Trade  openness  -0.293     0.261  1.270  -0.390  0.786**  0.332*    
  (0.65)      (0.29) (0.96) (0.61) (2.42) (1.84)     
Import  openness    -0.708         -0.029   
    ( 1   . 0 1 ) 0 . 4 6 )
0 . 2 4 ) . 9 7 )
0 . 0 9 )
. 8 7 )
. 0 5 )
. 6 8 )
. 7 1 )
9 5 )
. 2 4 )
       (    
Export  openness     0.235         0.983* 
1      (          (  
Volatility  of  government  revenue      -0.000        
      (         
Volatility  of  government  spending        0.008* 
1
      
      (         
Industry  diversification       -10.950 
1
     
       (        
Unemployment        -1.757      
        ( 0       
Service  sector        -1.987      
        ( 0       
Long-term  unemployment  rate         -2.831***
3 .
   
         (      
Degree  of  unionization         -3.273***
4
   
         (      
Reunification dummy 0/1  -1.566**  -1.560**  -1.561*  1.405*** -0.900**  -1.255  0.289***  -0.050  -0.028  -0.043 
  (2.29) (2.29) (2.26) (5.03) (2.78) (1.57) (5.46) (1.22) (0.95) (1.00) 
Constant  3.327***  3.347***  3.152*** 0.172  1.904* 4.498**  1.745*** -0.061 0.084** -0.119 
  (4.33) (5.02) (3.95) (0.43) (2.06) (2.54) (5.24) (0.51) (2.40) (0.87) 
Observations  340 339 340 190 140 340 270 290 289 290 
Number  of  states  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
R²  (within)  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.62 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20   35
Table 3: Determinants of Regional Employment Volatility (Quasi Panel) 
This Table presents results of fixed effects panel estimators. t-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the state-level are reported in brackets. All 
regressions are for all German states. Data are for the years 1975-2005. The dependent variable is the volatility of employment, calculated as the standard 
deviation of a non-overlapping 5-year window. ‘Unconditional’ is the unadjusted volatility of employment growth, ‘conditional’ is the volatility of the residuals 
of a regression of the growth rate of employment on up to five own lags, year fixed effects, and a unification dummy. See the Data Appendix for details on the 
specifications of the variables. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
  Unconditional employment volatility  Conditional employment volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Volatility of output growth  0.062 0.067* 0.066* -0.026 0.132  0.056 0.076 0.034 0.019 0.044
 (1.73) (1.96) (1.79) (0.38) (1.43)  (1.38) (1.64) (0.65) (0.30) (1.09)
Trade openness  -0.065 -0.567 0.912  -0.179 0.151 0.551**
 (0.27) (0.95) (1.27)  (0.89) (0.88) (2.47)
Import openness   -0.586**   0.551
 (2.34)   (1.52)
Export openness   0.448   0.978*
 (0.67)   (2.00)
Volatility of government revenue  0.051***  
 (3.04)  
Volatility of government spending  0.071*  
 (2.00)  
Industry diversification  -18.378 
  (0.99) 
Unemployment   -0.979
   (0.62)
Service sector   -1.854
   (1.07)
Long-term unemployment rate    -0.591
   (1.00)
Degree of unionization    -0.885
   (0.58)
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Table 3 continued 
  Dependent variable: unconditional employment volatility  Dependent variable: conditional 
employment volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Reunification dummy 0/1  0.054 0.066 0.046 -0.174* 0.276 0.338 0.205*** 0.145** 0.107* 0.126
 (0.47) (0.58) (0.42) (1.77) (1.55) (1.33) (3.08) (2.21) (2.02) (1.43)
Constant 0.700*** 0.778*** 0.590*** 0.718** 2.196 1.798* 0.939* -0.03 0.127 0.015
 (7.41) (10.46) (4.40) (2.40) (1.20) (1.88) (1.80) (0.19) (0.99) (0.09)
Observations 82 82 82 52 32 82 62 66 66 66
Number of states  16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
R²  0.57 0.57 0.57 0.6 0.41 0.58 0.37 0.19 0.17 0.18  37
 Table 4: Determinants of Regional Employment Volatility (Robustness Check without City States)  
This Table presents results of fixed effects panel estimators. t-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the state-level are reported in brackets. Data are 
for the years 1975-2005. The dependent variable is the volatility of employment computed as the squared residual of a regression of the growth rate of 
employment on up to five own lags, year fixed effects, and a unification dummy. See the Data Appendix for details on the specifications of the variables. ***, **, 
* = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
  Full Sample  Excluding Hamburg  Excluding Bremen  Full Sample  Full Sample 
    (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Volatility of output growth  0.056*** 0.058*** 0.050**  0.054** 0.061***  0.061*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.060***
  (3.43) (3.88)  (2.55)  (2.86)  (3.79)  (3.84) (3.42) (3.85) (3.50) (3.92) 
Trade  openness  0.276   0.459**   -0.013   0.345  0.092  
  (1.13)   (2.44)    (0.04)   (1.51)  (0.38)  
Openness * Hamburg              -0.228       
             (1.40)     
Openness  *  Bremen               0.412* 
.
 
               ( 1   8 9 )
. 5 1 )
. 4 5 )
 
Export  Openness    1.047*    1.326**   0.357   1.192**   0.695 
   (1.83)    (2.38)    (0.59)  (2.15)  (1.05) 
Export Openness * Hamburg                -0.576     
              ( 1     
Export Openness * Bremen                    0.661 
                ( 1  
Reunification dummy 0/1  -0.052  -0.043  -0.004  0.024 -0.059 -0.046  -0.055  -0.045 -0.065 -0.057 
  (1.27) (1.02)  (0.11)  (0.59)  (1.00)  (0.87) (1.27) (1.00) (1.39) (1.20) 
Constant  0.006 -0.085  -0.109  -0.212  0.141  0.063 -0.010 -0.107 0.063 -0.025 
  (0.05) (0.61)  (1.08)  (1.48)  (0.89)  (0.44) (0.09) (0.85) (0.49) (0.17) 
Observations  338 338  309  309  309  309 338 338 338 338 
Number  of  states  16 16  15  15  15  15 16 16 16 16 
R²  0.28 0.29  0.30  0.31  0.31  0.31 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.29 
   38
Table 5: Determinants of Regional Employment Volatility (Heteroscedastic Regression Model) 
This Table presents results of a heteroscedastic regression model as proposed by Harvey (1967). Observations are clustered at the state level. Robust t-values are 
reported in brackets. Regressions for the full sample include a full set of time and state-fixed effects. Regressions for the West German sample include time fixed 
effects only since the model did not converge for all specifications using state fixed effects. Data are for the years 1970-2003. See the Data Appendix for details 
on the specifications of the variables. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 Full  sample  West  Germany 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mean equation 
Output growth  0.177** 0.185*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.208*** 0.154***
 (2.30) (0.53) (0.59) (0.40) (6.04) (5.62) (0.20) (0.69)
Wage growth  -0.272* -0.265** -0.268** -0.272*** -0.186*** -0.185** -0.197*** -0.298***
 (1.65) (1.96) (2.68) (2.57) (2.61) (0.46) (0.03) (3.41)
Trade openness  -1.063 0.537 -0.639*** -0.250
 (0.68) (0.34) (1.94) (0.80)
Import openness  0.511 -0.760***
 (1.03) (5.05)
Export openness  -1.629 -0.988**
 (0.58) (2.38)
Unemployment -10.568** -6.779***
  (0.36) (4.07)
Service sector  5.365 0.174
  (0.39) (0.57)
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Table 5 continued 
 Full  sample  West  Germany 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variance equation 
Output growth  0.052 0.063 0.067 0.037 0.048 0.023 -0.022 0.065
 (4.08) (0.55) (4.06) (4.10) (0.35) (0.15) (7.80) (3.76)
Wage growth  0.153** 0.136* 0.136** 0.156*** -0.142 -0.113 -0.008 -0.274
 (2.00) (2.00) (1.83) (2.61) (0.48) (2.54) (2.89) (0.83)
Trade openness  29.428 -0.617 1.684**
 (0.11) (0.25) (6.32)
Import openness  -3.149 1.965*
 (0.44) (1.69)
Export openness  -1.947 2.098
 (0.59) (0.97)
Unemployment 5.447 6.279
  (2.50) (0.48)
Service sector  4.187 1.681
  (0.86) (0.40)
Observations 418 417 418 418 340 339 340 340
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